The End of Umpire?: Federalism and Judicial Restraint by Ryder, Bruce




Volume 34 (2006) Article 12
The End of Umpire?: Federalism and Judicial
Restraint
Bruce Ryder
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, bryder@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Ryder, Bruce. "The End of Umpire?: Federalism and Judicial Restraint." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional
Cases Conference 34. (2006).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol34/iss1/12
The End of Umpire? Federalism and 
Judicial Restraint 
Bruce Ryder* 
I. THE TURN TO JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
The Supreme Court of Canada released eight decisions in 2005 that 
dealt with challenges to the validity of legislation based on the division 
of powers in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.1 Not since 
1983, before Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 cases 
dominated its constitutional docket, has the Court decided so many 
federalism cases in a single year.  
In the 2005 decisions, the judges were united around an approach to 
federalism disputes that the Court has consolidated over the past 15 
years. With the exception of a lone justice in one case,3 in 2005 the 
Court was unanimous in affirming the validity and operation of the eight 
statutes challenged on division of powers grounds. A consistent posture 
of judicial restraint — or generous interpretations of the scope of both 
provincial and federal legislative jurisdiction — has been the defining 
feature of the Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence. 
The consensus on the current Court that declarations of ultra vires 
on federalism grounds should be issued rarely — with “extreme 
caution” in Patrick Monahan’s words4 — has been developing for two 
                                                                                                            
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. 
1 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
3 Castillo v. Castillo, [2005] S.C.J. No. 68, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 870, Bastarache J. concurring. 
4 Patrick Monahan, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Canadian Federalism, 1996-
2001” in P. Thibault, B. Pelletier & L. Perret, eds., Les mélanges Gérald-A. Beaudoin: Les défis du 
constitutionnalisme 353 (Cowansville, Que.: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2002). Monahan concludes his 
study by observing that “… the current Court regards federalism as a political arrangement 
designed to facilitate the achievement by provincial majorities of collective goals. This suggests an 
attitude of extreme caution on the part of the current Court before it rules provincial legislation 
invalid.” Id., at 366. I would add that this attitude of extreme caution is even more evident in the 
challenges to federal statutes that reach the Court. Together with the Court’s expansion of the 
paramountcy rule, and its increased resort to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to restrict the 
operation of provincial statutes, the Court appears even more concerned with facilitating the 
achievement of collective goals by the federal government. 
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decades. The Lamer Court was not shy about developing separation of 
powers doctrine5 or unwritten constitutional principles6 to place novel 
limits on the exercise of government power. But when it came to the 
division of powers, the Lamer Court exercised its power of judicial 
review in the direction of upholding challenged statutes, whether 
provincial or federal. The McLachlin Court, emphatically and usually 
unanimously, has continued this trend.  
Can anyone remember the last time the Court declared a statute 
ultra vires as an invasion of the other level of government’s exclusive 
jurisdiction in section 91 or 92? The last time a provincial law was 
declared invalid on federalism grounds was in the 1993 Morgentaler 
case,7 when Nova Scotia abortion regulations were found to be an 
invasion of the federal criminal law power. As for federal statutes, apart 
from an inconsequential provision of the proposed Civil Marriage Act 
that the Court said would be ultra vires in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Reference,8 one has to go back more than two decades, to the early 
1980s, to find the Court declaring a federal statute ultra vires on 
division of powers grounds.9 In short, when adjudicating federalism 
disputes, the Lamer and McLachlin Courts have followed the path of 
                                                                                                            
5 E.g., Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward 
Island, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges Reference”]; 
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1996] S.C.J. No. 83, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048. 
6 Provincial Judges Reference, id.; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 
61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [hereinafter “Secession Reference”]. 
7 R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] S.C.J. No. 95, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463. Of course, provincial 
statutes may be declared invalid for violating provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 other than the 
division of powers. For example, in Re Eurig Estate, [1998] S.C.J. No. 72, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565, a 
provincial regulation authorizing probate fees was found to be a valid exercise of provincial taxing 
powers pursuant to s. 92(2), but was invalidated on the grounds it was not authorized by the 
legislature as required by ss. 53 and 90.  
8 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 [hereinafter 
“Same-Sex Marriage Reference”]. The Court affirmed Parliament’s ability to pass legislation 
defining marriage, for civil purposes, as the union of two persons to the exclusion of all others. The 
second provision of the Proposed Act, a declaratory provision stating that “[n]othing in the Act 
would affect the freedom of officials of religious groups to refuse to perform marriages that are not 
in accordance with their religious beliefs,” was found to be in relation to the solemnization of 
marriage, a matter within provincial jurisdiction pursuant to s. 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
and thus ultra vires Parliament. Id., at paras. 35-39. 
9 See, e.g., Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Mackenzie, [1982] S.C.J. No. 58, [1982] 2 
S.C.R. 9 (severing invalid portion of Criminal Code provision); Reference re Proposed Federal Tax 
on Exported Natural Gas, [1982] S.C.J. No. 52, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1004 (part of proposed federal Bill 
ruled ultra vires). 
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judicial restraint to a degree that is unprecedented in the Supreme 
Court’s history.10  
A great deal of Canadian constitutional scholarship takes for granted 
the importance and necessity of judges taking on the role of umpires of 
Canadian federalism. Without a neutral umpire to adjudicate disputes 
regarding the division of legislative powers, the argument goes, the 
constitution’s commitment to the federal principle would not be 
secured.11 Others, like Paul Weiler, have argued that we would be better 
off if the courts did not enforce the constitutional division of powers at 
all (apart from asserting federal paramountcy where necessary) and 
simply left it to the politically accountable actors to determine the scope 
of their respective law-making powers.12 The Court’s disinclination, 
since the early 1980s, to issue declarations of invalidity on division of 
powers grounds brings its current practices close to Weiler’s views. The 
Court appears to be reaching the “end of umpire”, preferring to leave the 
definition of jurisdictional boundaries to governments.  
A closer look at the Court’s federalism jurisprudence reveals a more 
complicated situation than simple judicial restraint in division of powers 
cases. The Court has almost entirely abandoned, for more than two 
decades, the use of declarations of ultra vires to police the division of 
powers. Over the same period, however, the Court has demonstrated an 
increased willingness to invoke the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine 
and the paramountcy doctrine to limit the application and operation of 
provincial statutes. These decidedly one-sided doctrines serve to limit 
                                                                                                            
10 Patrick Monahan, in his study of the Court’s federalism decisions from 1950 to 1984, 
found that the percentages of statutes challenged on federalism grounds held to be ultra vires 
ranged from a low of 20 per cent in the 1960s to over 40 per cent in the 1950s and from 1980-84. 
See Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme 
Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 152. While I am not aware of any published data 
covering the entire post-1984 period since Monahan’s study, it is clear that the percentage of 
challenged statutes held to be ultra vires on federalism grounds has plummeted since the early 
1980s. See Monahan, supra, note 4, for an analysis of the case law from 1996 to 2001. 
11 For an insightful discussion of the umpire metaphor as a description and ideal of the 
Court’s role in federalism cases, see Donna Greschner, “The Supreme Court, Federalism and 
Metaphors of Moderation” (2001) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 47. Wayne MacKay has argued that the umpire 
metaphor obscures the political nature of constitutional decision-making and the creative role that 
the judges play in formulating the rules of federalism. See A. Wayne MacKay, “The Supreme Court 
and Federalism: Does/Should Anyone Care Anymore?” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 241. 
12 Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of The Supreme Court of Canada 
(Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974). In his provocative chapter entitled “The Umpire of Canadian 
Federalism”, Weiler argued that “federalism cases involve essentially non-legal conflicts which will 
not be dealt with very successfully in the judicial process, and that courts should avoid the area 
unless their intervention is absolutely vital”. Id., at 174. 
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provincial legislative powers, but have no impact on federal legislative 
powers. The Court’s recent record in federalism disputes is thus a mix 
of judicial restraint and activism: restraint regarding declarations of 
invalidity, and activism when it comes to reading down or suspending 
provincial statutes. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S THEORY OF FEDERALISM 
The Court’s federalism decisions in 2005 involved a range of important 
federal and provincial laws. For the first time, the Court upheld the 
validity of the federal Trade-marks Act, and its “passing off” civil 
remedy, relying on an expansive interpretation of the trade and 
commerce power.13 Reversing the Quebec Court of Appeal, it found that 
the maternity and parental leave provisions of the federal Employment 
Insurance Act fell within a large and progressive interpretation of the 
federal power to make laws in relation to unemployment insurance.14 
The Court was equally generous in its interpretation of the scope of 
provincial jurisdiction. It gave effect to Saskatchewan’s prohibition on 
retail displays of tobacco products,15 applied Quebec labour statutes to a 
bankrupt employer,16 upheld the ability of a Quebec marketing statute to 
regulate the production of chickens destined for sale outside of the 
province,17 affirmed Quebec’s ability to regulate the colour of imported 
margarine sold in the province,18 suggested in obiter dicta that an 
Alberta limitations statute could apply to civil actions arising in foreign 
jurisdictions,19 and upheld British Columbia’s novel legislation altering 
                                                                                                            
13 Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302 
[hereinafter “Kirkbi”]. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13. 
14 Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, 
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [hereinafter “Employment Insurance Reference”]. 
15 Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
188 [hereinafter “Rothmans”]. 
16 D.I.M.S. Construction Inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 
52, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 564. 
17 Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, 
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 [hereinafter “Pelland”]. 
18 UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 
143 [hereinafter “UL Canada”]. 
19 Castillo v. Castillo, supra, note 3. 
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the rules of civil liability and civil procedure in actions against tobacco 
manufacturers.20 
This unusually high number of decisions affords us ample sources 
— relatively rare in the Charter era — to discern the understanding of 
federalism that is animating the Supreme Court’s decision-making. This 
task, however, is complicated by the Court’s reticence in recent division 
of powers cases — in contrast to its celebrated opinions in the 
Patriation Reference21 and the Secession Reference22 — to discuss the 
nature of Canadian federalism at any length. Indeed, it sometimes 
appears that the Supreme Court’s theory of federalism is that it has no 
theory.  
The Court has found little need to recognize the distinctiveness of 
its approach or to express its views on such issues as the relative merits 
of centralization versus decentralization, unity versus diversity, or 
exclusivity versus concurrency. Indeed, Deschamps J., speaking on 
behalf of the Court in the Employment Insurance Reference, cast doubt 
on whether the Court could unite around a particular view of Canadian 
federalism. In an unusually candid and revealing passage, she wrote as 
follows: 
To derive the evolution of constitutional powers from the structure of 
Canada is delicate, as what that structure is will often depend on a 
given court’s view of what federalism is. What are regarded as the 
characteristic features of federalism may vary from one judge to 
another, and will be based on political rather than legal notions. The 
task of maintaining the balance between federal and provincial powers 
falls primarily to governments. If an issue comes before a court, the 
court must refer to the framers’ description of the power in order to 
identify its essential components, and must be guided by the way in 
which courts have interpreted the power in the past. In this area, the 
meaning of the words used may be adapted to modern-day realities, in 
a manner consistent with the separation of powers of the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches.23 
                                                                                                            
20 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 473 [hereinafter “Imperial Tobacco”]. 
21 Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 
S.C.R. 753. 
22 Supra, note 6. 
23 Supra, note 14, at para. 10. 
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Justice Deschamps’ description of the Court’s role is fascinating. It 
seems to cast doubt on the ability of the judges to agree on a theory of 
federalism, and yet simultaneously puts forward important judicial 
ingredients of just such a theory. In the end, with all due respect, 
Deschamps J. takes too modest a view of the judicial role. As several 
generations of constitutional scholars have emphasized, the text (“the 
framers’ description of the power”) and precedents (“the way in which 
courts have interpreted the power in the past”) do not determine results 
in particular cases. The characterization of the subject matter of laws, 
and their allocation to particular heads of power, are value-laden 
exercises that involve a degree of judicial choice.24 As a result, the Court 
inevitably plays a creative and significant role in the evolution of 
Canadian federalism.25 The Court’s decisions are guided by the 
constitutional text and past precedents, to be sure, but ultimately the 
Court must also make value choices about how the constitutional 
division of powers should help give shape to the federation. 
Justice Deschamps’ remarks were the most perceptive and candid 
issued by the Court in its 2005 federalism decisions. More typically, the 
Court tends to eschew explicit normative or theoretical discussion in 
division of powers cases. But I would argue that an immanent theory of 
federalism resides within the Court’s jurisprudence. The features of the 
Court’s theory of federalism can be cobbled together from what the 
Court has said and done in division of powers cases. I would suggest 
that the following six propositions capture the essence of the Court’s 
approach to the interpretation of the division of powers: 
1. Judicial interpretation of the constitution is partly and unavoidably 
subjective. Care should be taken to ensure that subjective judicial 
views do not thwart laws enacted by democratically accountable 
legislatures. Democracy is promoted by generous and flexible 
interpretations of both federal and provincial legislative powers. The 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of an appropriate balance 
between federal and provincial powers lies with the politically 
accountable branches of government.26  
                                                                                                            
24 See, e.g., Bora Laskin, “Tests for the Validity of Legislation: What’s the Matter?” 
(1955) 11 U.T.L.J. 114; W.R. Lederman, “Classification of Laws and the British North America 
Act” in Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas 229 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981); Peter 
W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at chapter 15.5(g). 
25 For a recent elaboration of this theme, see A. Wayne MacKay, supra, note 11. 
26 Employment Insurance Reference, per Deschamps J., supra, note 14. 
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2. A large measure of judicial restraint should be exercised before laws 
are declared ultra vires on division of powers grounds, especially 
where jurisdictional conflict is absent or where governments have 
worked together to forge a cooperative legislative solution. 
Legislation should be declared ultra vires only when the enacting 
legislature has exceeded the boundaries of its jurisdiction in a 
manner that blatantly disregards the jurisprudence.27 
3. It is particularly important that the courts permit the growth of 
federal legislative power through broad and dynamic interpretations 
of federal heads of power.28  
4. The growth of de facto areas of concurrent jurisdiction should be 
welcomed. Overlap and interaction of federal and provincial powers 
should be tolerated and even promoted as an inevitable aspect of a 
modern, federal state.29 
5. Exclusive federal powers deserve greater protection from provincial 
incursion than exclusive provincial powers do from federal 
                                                                                                            
27 Id. See also Pelland, supra, note 17. 
28 The Court has not stated this proposition explicitly, but it is supported by its interpretive 
practices. The Court has issued generous interpretations of a number of federal heads of power, 
many of which pushed these powers beyond their traditional parameters. See, for example, the 
Employment Insurance Reference, supra, note 14, regarding the unemployment insurance power in 
s. 91(2A); the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, supra, note 8, regarding the marriage power in 
s. 91(26); R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 
regarding the national concern branch of the peace, order and good government power; General 
Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 and 
Kirkbi, supra, note 13, regarding the general regulation of trade branch of s. 91(2); and, perhaps 
most dramatically, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, 
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 and Reference 
re the Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, regarding the criminal law 
power in s. 91(27). Assessing the latter three rulings, Peter Hogg has written that Parliament “can 
do much more with its criminal law power than we imagined 50 years ago, or even 10 years ago”. 
Peter W. Hogg, “The Expansion of the Federal Power Over Criminal Law” in P. Thibault, B. 
Pelletier and L. Perret, eds., supra, note 4, 233 at 240. The Court’s rulings have not resulted in 
similarly dramatic expansion of the scope of provincial heads of power. Jean Leclair has argued 
that the weight the Court accords to functional efficiency explains its tendency to strengthen the 
powers of the central government at the expense of regional diversity: see Jean Leclair, “The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity” 
(2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 411. 
29 Ontario (Attorney General) v. OPSEU, [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 18. 
The tolerance of overlap and interplay between federal and provincial powers was evident in many 
of the 2005 decisions that upheld provincial or federal statutes despite their significant effects on 
subject matters within the other level of government’s exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kirkbi, 
supra, note 13; Employment Insurance Reference, supra, note 14; Pelland, supra, note 17; UL 
Canada, supra, note 18; Imperial Tobacco, supra, note 20. 
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incursion. The interjurisdictional immunity should be used to 
prevent provincial laws from applying to matters at the core of 
federal jurisdiction; no similar principle prevents federal laws from 
applying to matters at the core of provincial jurisdiction.30 
6. The primacy of federal legislative policies must be protected by a 
broad interpretation of the federal paramountcy rule.31 
The trend towards judicial restraint regarding declarations of ultra 
vires is a product of the Court giving effect to the first four postulates 
outlined above. The final two points give primacy to federal areas of 
jurisdiction or federal legislative policies, resulting in a trend towards 
increased judicial restriction of the permissible scope of application or 
operation of validly enacted provincial statutes.  
In the balance of the paper, I will describe how the Court’s approach 
to federalism cases outlined above was consolidated in its 2005 
decisions. The Court gave expansive interpretations to federal powers 
(Part III below) and applied established interpretations of provincial 
powers in a flexible and generous manner (Part IV). It also confirmed its 
willingness to use the federal paramountcy rule to protect the primacy of 
federal legislative objectives (Part V). In the concluding section, Part 
VI, I will argue that the Court’s theory of federalism is laudable from 
the point of view of the democratic principle, but has more contradictory 
and problematic implications that may pose a threat to the federal 
principle in the long run. 
                                                                                                            
30 For applications of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to read down provincial 
statutes, see Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437; Commission de 
transport de la communauté urbaine de Québec v. Canada (National Battlefields Commission), 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 90, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 838; Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la 
sécurité du travail), [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749. The Court has declined to apply the 
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in a reciprocal manner to protect provincial heads of power 
from federal incursion. See, e.g., Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of 
Transport), [1992] S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations 
Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327; Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada 
(Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), [1989] S.C.J. No. 84, [1989] 2 
S.C.R. 225. 
31 The Court has not stated this proposition explicitly, but it flows from its reasoning in 
Rothmans, supra, note 15, at paras. 11-14. See also Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] S.C.J. No. 9, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 121, at 155; Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] S.C.J. No. 66, 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 113, at paras. 69-70. 
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III. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL POWERS 
The Court upheld the two federal statutes that were challenged in 2005, 
and did so by broadly interpreting the federal legislative powers at stake.  
1. Employment Insurance Reference 
The Employment Insurance Reference32 was the one federalism case in 
2005 in which a provincial government and the federal government 
clashed over a matter of jurisdiction. In conformity with a familiar 
pattern in Canadian federalism, the federal government prevailed in the 
courts, while Quebec’s position was accommodated politically through 
intergovernmental negotiations. 
At issue in the Employment Insurance Reference were the 
provisions of the federal Employment Insurance Act that confer 
maternity and parental benefits on eligible employees. The Quebec 
government initiated the reference after establishing its own Parental 
Insurance Plan in 2001, taking the position that the legislative provision 
of maternity and parental benefits falls within exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction pursuant to section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In 
a unanimous ruling, the Quebec Court of Appeal agreed, striking down 
sections 22 and 23 of the Employment Insurance Act. The Supreme 
Court allowed the appeal, unanimously affirming the validity of the 
challenged federal provisions.  
The competing approaches taken by the two Courts to the 
interpretation of the federal power to make laws in relation to 
unemployment insurance pursuant to section 91(2A) of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 make for a stark and fascinating contrast.  
The Quebec Court of Appeal favoured a “mini-compact theory” that 
focused on the nature of the bargain made between the federal 
government and the provinces in 1940 when the Constitution was 
amended to give the federal government jurisdiction over 
unemployment insurance. For the Quebec Court of Appeal, the starting 
point was the protection of provincial jurisdiction over social policy: 
“these are measures which normally fall within provincial 
jurisdiction.”33 In the Court’s view, the degree of subtraction from 
                                                                                                            
32 Supra, note 14. 
33 Reference re Sections 22 and 23 of the Employment Insurance Act (Canada), [2004] 
J.Q. No. 277, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 515, at 527 (C.A.). 
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provincial jurisdiction accomplished by the 1940 amendment should be 
limited strictly to the intent of the governments that negotiated that 
agreement. The Court thus accorded “primary importance”34 to the 
evidence from the time suggesting that “unemployment insurance” was 
limited to an insurance scheme for earnings lost “for economic reasons” 
and not “for reasons based on personal circumstances”.35 Reliance on the 
“living tree” metaphor would be inappropriate, the Court said, because it 
would constitute a betrayal of the agreement regarding the limited 
jurisdiction transferred by the provinces to the federal Parliament with 
the enactment of section 91(2A). In the Court’s view, expansion of 
federal powers should take place only with provincial consent through 
the constitutional amending procedure. In conclusion, the Court wrote, 
… the sections constitute an encroachment by the Canadian 
Parliament into a field which is reserved for the provinces, whereas no 
constitutional amendment has been enacted since 1940 which allows 
this. In the absence of any such amendment, I cannot see how one can 
set aside the consensus which was reached in order to add s. 91(2A) to 
the Constitution Act, 1867, a consensus which was based upon a 
highly restricted definition of the expression employment insurance.36 
In allowing the appeal, and affirming the validity of the challenged 
provisions, the Supreme Court rejected the “mini-compact theory” 
adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal. The starting point for the 
Supreme Court was not the preservation of provincial jurisdiction over 
social programs, or a strict interpretation of the 1940 amendment, but a 
generous and dynamic interpretation of federal power. Justice 
Deschamps, writing for a unanimous Court, chastised the Quebec Court 
of Appeal for placing such great weight on historical evidence of 
“original intent”. While debates at the time are relevant, they cannot be 
treated as conclusive, Deschamps J. wrote, for the Court takes a 
progressive or dynamic approach to the interpretation of constitutional 
language.37  
The same type of contest — between original intent and the need to 
update constitutional powers to meet changing social meanings and 
                                                                                                            
34 Id., at 528. 
35 Id., at 543. 
36 Id., at 551-52. 
37 Supra, note 14, at para. 9. 
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needs — arose in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference.38 Just as the 
Attorney General of Quebec in the Employment Insurance Reference 
argued that “unemployment insurance” had a fixed meaning, some 
intervenors argued that the meaning of marriage was fixed according to 
historical understandings limiting it to opposite-sex unions. The Court 
disagreed: 
The “frozen concepts” reasoning runs contrary to one of the most 
fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that 
our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive 
interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern 
life. … A large and liberal, or progressive, interpretation ensures the 
continued relevance and, indeed, legitimacy of Canada’s constituting 
document. By way of progressive interpretation our Constitution 
succeeds in its ambitious enterprise, that of structuring the exercise of 
power by the organs of the state in times vastly different from those in 
which it was crafted.39 
Once the words of the Constitution are unhinged from original 
intent, and their meaning is freed to change with the times, the Court 
must face the formidable challenge of developing a methodology for 
ascertaining the limits of any particular federal or provincial head of 
power. In an impressive discussion that makes a considerable 
contribution to the jurisprudence, Deschamps J. confronted this difficult 
problem head on. Quoting Henri Brun and Guy Tremblay, she argued 
that the “essential elements” of a head of power can be identified by 
reference to the text and original intent, and then, within the confines of 
those essential elements, a generous and progressive interpretation can 
be guided by evolving social needs.40  
Applying this approach, Deschamps J. concluded that the essential 
elements of unemployment insurance are that it is a public insurance 
plan aimed at preserving economic security by paying temporary 
income replacement benefits in the event of an interruption of 
employment.41 As labour market conditions evolve, so may the scope of 
                                                                                                            
38 Supra, note 8. 
39 Id., at paras. 22-23. 
40
 Employment Insurance Reference, supra, note 14, at paras. 36, 44-46 and 76. There is a 
great deal of judicial discretion in the identification of essential elements and evolving social needs, 
to be sure. But one cannot banish elements of subjectivity from any approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Justice Deschamps’ approach provides a principled structure to the process of 
dynamic interpretation. 
41 Id., at para. 48. 
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federal jurisdiction. She then undertook a historical review of changes in 
the nature of employment, including women’s increased participation in 
the labour force since 1940. She concluded that the maternity and 
parental benefits at issue are, in pith and substance, a mechanism for 
providing replacement income when employment is interrupted that 
respond to contemporary workplace realities. Thus, they fall within the 
essential elements of the federal power.  
Justice Deschamps’ powerful ruling results in Parliament and the 
provincial legislatures having overlapping jurisdiction to make laws in 
relation to maternity and parental benefits, Parliament pursuant to 
section 91(2A), and the provincial legislatures pursuant to section 
92(13). Justice Deschamps commented that “[t]he power of one level of 
government to legislate in relation to one aspect of a matter takes 
nothing away from the power of the other level to control another aspect 
within its own jurisdiction.”42 But is concurrency really just a win-win 
situation? Can we be so sanguine about the effects of shared jurisdiction 
on the federal principle?  
The de facto concurrency that results from overlapping legislative 
powers has the potential advantage of permitting the expression of 
democratic will by either or both levels of government. This democratic 
advantage, however, comes at some risk to the federal principle. As 
discussed in Part V below, the Court has expanded its definition of the 
circumstances that give rise to federal paramountcy, thus making it 
possible for the federal Parliament to choose to block the operation of 
provincial laws in areas of shared jurisdiction. Moreover, even if 
Parliament chooses not to assert the primacy of its legislative policies, 
the passage of federal legislation may have the effect of ousting 
provincial jurisdiction as a matter of practical political realities. For 
example, the Quebec government’s ability to pursue a distinct maternity 
and parental benefits program would have been severely limited if the 
federal government had insisted that the federal program must operate 
equally in Quebec, as it could have following the Court’s ruling in the 
Employment Insurance Reference. The jurisprudence empowers 
Parliament to transform areas of concurrent jurisdiction into areas of de 
facto federal exclusivity. Thus, while Deschamps J.’s generous and 
dynamic interpretation of federal power advances the democratic 
principle by giving federal and provincial legislatures alike the 
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flexibility to respond to new social needs, its implications for the federal 
principle are more problematic. 
The Employment Insurance Reference affirmed the legal capacity of 
the federal Parliament to legislate a national scheme of maternity and 
parental benefits. Provincial governments interested in pursuing distinct 
policies could do so only if they succeeded in persuading the federal 
government to move aside in the name of provincial autonomy. 
Fortunately, from the point of view of the federal principle, Quebec has 
sufficient political power to extract concessions from the federal 
government in areas of shared jurisdiction, concessions that can then 
operate to the advantage of other interested provinces. In the period 
between the Quebec Court of Appeal and Supreme Court rulings, the 
Quebec and federal governments concluded an agreement whereby 
Quebec will operate its own Parental Insurance Plan which will provide 
maternity and parental benefits to Quebec claimants in lieu of the 
similar benefits in the Employment Insurance Act.43 Despite the legal 
potential for federal dominance created by the Court’s ruling, the 
politics of Canadian federalism made room for the accommodation of 
Quebec’s ability to pursue distinct social policies. 
2. Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings 
At issue in Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings44 (the “Lego v. MegaBloks 
case”) was the constitutional validity of the “passing off” action in 
section 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act. In upholding section 7(b) as a valid 
exercise of federal jurisdiction pursuant to the “general regulation of 
trade” branch of the trade and commerce power in section 91(2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, the Court did not purport to expand the scope of 
federal jurisdiction. Rather, it simply applied the principles set out in 
                                                                                                            
43 To enable the legislative implementation of the agreement with Quebec, in 2005 
Parliament added s. 23(3.5) to the Employment Insurance Act, providing that federal parental 
benefits will be reduced or eliminated where “benefits are payable to a claimant … for the same 
reasons under a provincial law …”. S.C. 1996, c. 23, s. 23, as amended by S.C. 2005, c. 30, s. 130. 
The Act already included a similar provision — s. 22(3) — permitting distinct provincial 
approaches to the provision of maternity benefits. 
44 Supra, note 13. I should acknowledge that I appeared as counsel for the respondent 
Ritvik Holdings (Mega Bloks), unsuccessfully arguing against the constitutional validity of s. 7(b) 
of the Trade-marks Act. The reader may be justified in dismissing the comments that follow as sour 
grapes.  
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General Motors of Canada v. City National Leasing,45 the only other 
case in the modern era to result in legislation being upheld pursuant to 
the general regulation of trade power. However, the Court’s approach to 
the potential breadth of the general regulation of trade power was far 
less cautious in 2005 than it was in 1989. The Court in Kirkbi was 
cavalier in authorizing overlapping federal legislation regarding local 
trade and the creation of civil causes of action, matters that according to 
section 92(13) fall within exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Thus, 
beneath the surface appearance of simple fidelity to precedent, the 
Kirkbi ruling is as strong an indication of the Court’s willingness to 
interpret federal powers expansively as the more candid reasoning in the 
Employment Insurance Reference and the Same-Sex Marriage 
Reference. 
Chief Justice Dickson in the General Motors case established five 
criteria to guide the determination of whether federal legislation that 
regulates local trade may nevertheless, in pith and substance, be in 
relation to the general regulation of trade: (i) the impugned legislation 
must be part of a regulatory scheme; (ii) the scheme must be 
monitored by the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency; (iii) the 
legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole rather than with a 
particular industry; (iv) the legislation should be of a nature that 
provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of 
enacting; and (v) the failure to include one or more provinces or 
localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful 
operation of the scheme in other parts of the country.46 In General 
Motors, the Court had no difficulty concluding that the Combines 
Investigation Act (now the Competition Act) satisfied these criteria 
and thus was a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction. Similarly, LeBel 
J. found it evident that the Trade-marks Act, the constitutional 
validity of which had not previously been affirmed, also satisfied the 
criteria for a valid exercise of the general regulation of trade power.47 
More controversial was whether section 7(b) could also be held to 
be constitutionally valid because of a sufficiently strong connection to 
the regulatory scheme in the Trade-marks Act as a whole. Looked at in 
isolation, section 7(b) is clearly unconstitutional. Section 7(b) codifies 
                                                                                                            
45 [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641. 
46 Id., at 662-63, as summarized by LeBel J. in Kirkbi, supra, note 13, at para. 17. 
47 Supra, note 13, at paras. 28-31. 
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common law and civil law principles of liability and extends them on a 
national basis. It creates a statutory civil action that can be pursued in 
the Federal Court for losses resulting from a person directing “public 
attention to his wares, services or business in such a way as to cause or 
be likely to cause confusion in Canada … with the wares, services or 
business of another”.48 The creation of civil actions is a matter within 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction pursuant to section 92(13) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. As the Court stated in General Motors, and 
reiterated in Kirkbi, “this provincial power over civil rights is a 
significant power and one that is not lightly encroached upon”.49 The 
question, then, was whether section 7(b) is closely connected to a public 
scheme of national economic regulation, or whether it creates a free-
standing national private tort action in violation of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction. 
This question was much easier to answer regarding the civil remedy 
at issue in General Motors. The civil action in the Combines 
Investigation Act supplemented public mechanisms of oversight and 
enforcement. Chief Justice Dickson’s judgment devotes a great deal of 
attention to the presence of a scheme of public regulation operating 
under the oversight of a regulatory agency, and the enlistment of private 
enforcement through civil causes of action as an ancillary aspect of the 
scheme.  
In contrast, the pith and substance of the scheme of regulation in the 
Trade-marks Act, operating under the oversight of the Registrar of 
Trade-marks, is the maintenance and operation of a trade-mark registry, 
and the ensuing efficient enforcement of registered trade-mark rights on 
a national basis through an infringement action. Section 7(b) has no 
significance for the holders of registered trade-marks; it is redundant in 
the face of the more powerful infringement action available to them. 
The significance of section 7(b) is that it permits the holders of 
unregistered trade-marks, defined by common law and civil law rules 
falling within exclusive provincial jurisdiction, to bring passing-off 
actions in Federal Court that could lead to the issuance of a remedy 
enforceable on a national basis. Apart from section 7, unregistered 
trade-marks are not protected by the regulatory scheme; the oversight of 
the Registrar of Trade-marks does not relate to them. In short, section 
                                                                                                            
48 Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, s. 7(b). 
49 General Motors, supra, note 45, at 672-73; Kirkbi, supra, note 13, at para. 23. 
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7(b) does not appear to have any connection to a public scheme of 
national economic regulation. 
It was for this reason that another provision of the same section was 
declared invalid by the Court in MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd.50 The 
Court held that section 7(e) constituted an invasion of exclusive 
provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights, and had no 
connection to the regulatory scheme set out in the Trade-marks Act. As 
Laskin C.J. wrote for the majority: 
 One looks in vain for any regulatory scheme in s. 7, let alone 
s. 7(e). Its enforcement is left to the chance of private redress without 
public monitoring by the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency 
which would at least lend some colour to the alleged national or 
Canada-wide sweep of s. 7(e). … Even on the footing of being 
concerned with practices in the conduct of trade, its private 
enforcement by civil action gives it a local cast because it is as 
applicable in its terms to local or intraprovincial competitors as it is to 
competitors in interprovincial trade.51 
The absence of regulatory oversight, or of any connection to a 
public scheme of national economic regulation, is equally true regarding 
section 7(b). The only difference is that, unlike section 7(e), section 7(b) 
shares with the rest of the Act the subject matter of trade-marks and the 
policy of protecting the holders of trade-marks from others trading on 
their goodwill through the use of confusing marks. But this shared 
subject matter and policy should not be constitutionally significant. 
After all, trade-marks, unlike patents and copyrights, are not a federal 
head of power. The Trade-marks Act is valid only because it consists, in 
pith and substance, of a public scheme of national economic regulation 
that differentiates it from regulation of local trade and the creation of 
civil causes of action. Otherwise, federal regulation of trade-marks 
would not be lifted out of provincial jurisdiction in relation to “property 
and civil rights” and into federal jurisdiction over the general regulation 
of trade. To be valid, therefore, section 7(b) has to be closely connected 
to that public scheme of regulation, not to the subject matter or policy of 
trade-marks writ large. The definition and protection of unregistered 
                                                                                                            
50 [1976] S.C.J. No. 60, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134. 
51 Id., at 165. 
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trade-mark rights remains a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 92(13).52  
Furthermore, the civil action in General Motors was limited by its 
terms to the enforcement of the public prohibitions in the Combines 
Investigation Act. In other words, it was a new federal statutory tort. In 
contrast, section 7(b) is a simple codification and extension on a 
national basis of well-established common law and civil law principles 
of tortious responsibility. In this light, LeBel J.’s conclusions that 
section 7(b) is “limited in its application” and represents a minimal 
intrusion on exclusive provincial jurisdiction are hard to understand.53  
Section 7(b) does not make any reference to trade-marks or to other 
provisions of the Trade-marks Act. When LeBel J. comments that the 
purpose of section 7(b) “is to enforce the substantive aspects of the 
Trade-marks Act relating to unregistered trade-marks”,54 he is engaged 
in an unspecified degree of “reading down” of the general language of 
the provision and finding connections with the rest of the Act that are at 
best obscure.55  
In short, the Court’s analysis leading to the upholding of section 
7(b) pursuant to the general regulation of trade power was remarkably 
                                                                                                            
52 See Hugues Richard, “De la constitutionallité de l’alinéa 7(b) de la Loi sur les marques 
de commerce” (1988-89) 1 Les Cahiers de propriété intellectuelle 229, at 232 : “Une marque non 
enregistrée existe en vertu des dispositions du droit civil au Québec et de la common law dans les 
autres provinces. Sa naissance, sa subsistence et son extinction dépendent du droit provincial 
applicable dans chaque province. Quant à nous, une marque de commerce non enregistrée existe 
complètement à l’extérieur du SYSTÈME DE RÉGLEMENTATION établi par le Parlement dans 
l’exercice de sa competence à l’égard des marques de commerce.” 
53 Kirkbi, supra, note 13, at paras. 26 and 27. 
54 Id., at para. 25. 
55 The lack of a strong connection between s. 7(b) and the trade-marks registration scheme 
that is the pith and substance of the Act is confirmed by the legislative history of s. 7. When 
Parliament originally enacted a trade-mark registration scheme in 1868, the civil action in the 
federal statute could be invoked only to prevent the unauthorized use of registered trade-marks. 
With the passage of s. 11 of the Unfair Competition Act in 1932 (the precursor to the present s. 7 of 
the Trade-marks Act), Parliament enacted prohibitions that extended beyond the use of registered 
trade-marks for the first time. The legislative debates in 1932 make clear that Parliament’s purpose 
in enacting s. 11 was not to bolster or otherwise support the existing regulatory scheme for 
registered trade-marks. Rather, relying principally on its assumed power to implement Canada’s 
international treaties, Parliament’s purpose was to create more general statutory prohibitions on 
unfair competition in accordance with Canada’s obligations pursuant to Article 10 bis of the 
International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as revised at The Hague in 
1925. See House of Commons Debates (1932) at 11-12, 162, 2541-2; Senate Debates (1932) at 419. 
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deferential to Parliament56 and suggests that the Court may be open to 
further expansion of federal jurisdiction over economic regulation in the 
future.  
IV. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF PROVINCIAL POWERS 
In 2005, the Supreme Court rejected three challenges to the operation or 
application of valid provincial statutes,57 and upheld three provincial 
statutes from challenges to their validity on division of powers 
grounds.58 The Court’s decisions upholding the validity of provincial 
statutes did not require the development of new legal doctrine or the 
bold expansion of provincial heads of power as we saw regarding 
federal powers in the Employment Insurance Reference and the Kirkbi 
case. The Court has generously interpreted provincial jurisdiction, but it 
has not been eloquent in its recent decisions about the importance of 
respecting provincial autonomy. The Court has simply interpreted well-
established principles in a manner that has been favourable to provincial 
legislative jurisdiction. In particular, the Court has used the pith and 
substance doctrine and its corollary, the incidental effects doctrine, to 
uphold provincial statutes so long as they have had a strong connection 
to a matter within provincial jurisdiction. The fact that these statutes 
also had substantial impact on matters outside of jurisdiction was 
characterized as incidental, irrelevant for the purposes of constitutional 
validity. 
1. UL Canada v. Quebec 
For example, in UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General),59 at 
issue was the constitutional validity of a Quebec regulation prohibiting 
the sale of yellow margarine in the province. The regulation serves the 
interests of the dairy industry, which is anxious to protect butter from 
                                                                                                            
56 No doubt part of the explanation for the Court’s apparently casual treatment of the 
constitutional issue in Kirkbi was the lack of a jurisdictional conflict behind the constitutional 
argument. Indeed, the Quebec Attorney General was the only provincial Attorney General to 
intervene at the Supreme Court and it did so in support of the constitutional validity of s. 7(b). 
57 Notes 15 to 17, supra. 
58 Notes 18 to 20, supra. 
59 [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
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the spread of margarine.60 UL Canada, a subsidiary of Unilever, which 
controls more than one-half of the margarine market in Quebec, 
imported yellow margarine into Quebec with the purpose of initiating a 
legal challenge to the regulation. The Quebec courts upheld the validity 
of the regulation, as did the Supreme Court, dismissing the appeal in a 
short oral decision delivered at the hearing without having to hear 
Quebec’s submissions. Justice LeBel, stating the opinion of the Court, 
dispensed with the division of powers’ argument in two sentences: 
The appellant [UL Canada] has not shown that this Court should 
intervene to reverse the judgments of the courts below. Based on the 
constitutional principles governing the division of legislative powers, 
the impugned regulatory provision is within the limits of the 
provinces’ legislative authority over local trade.61 
One wonders why the Court granted leave, and stated four 
constitutional questions, when it ended up having so little to say about 
the result. To find a more sustained description of the scope and 
importance of provincial jurisdiction in relation to local trade, one must 
turn to the reasons of the Quebec Court of Appeal62 (which presumably 
the Supreme Court agreed with, although LeBel J. did not say so 
explicitly).  
UL had argued that the pith and substance of the regulation was in 
relation to international trade since it prevented foreign manufacturers of 
yellow margarine from selling their product in the province. UL was 
continuing a half-century-long constitutional struggle to legalize the sale 
of margarine in Canada. In the Margarine Reference, the Supreme Court 
held that a federal law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of 
margarine, which also had the purpose of protecting the dairy industry, 
was ultra vires.63 The regulation of the manufacture and sale of 
margarine fell within provincial jurisdiction. The Court upheld the 
validity of one provision of the federal law, the prohibition on  
the importation of margarine. The Quebec government responded to the 
Court’s 1948 opinion by promptly passing its own law prohibiting  
the sale and manufacture of margarine in the province. The Quebec law 
                                                                                                            
60 “Low-fat spat”, The Economist, March 28, 2002. 
61 Supra, note 59, at para. 1. 
62 [2003] J.Q. No. 13505, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 398 (C.A.). 
63 Reference re: Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, affd 
[1951] A.C. 179 (P.C.) (sub nom. Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Attorney-General for 
Quebec). 
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has since evolved into a prohibition only on margarine that looks like 
butter. 
The Quebec regulation prohibiting the sale of yellow margarine at 
issue in UL Canada makes no distinction between imported and locally 
produced margarine. UL Canada argued that the regulation’s impact on 
imported products constituted an invasion of federal jurisdiction in 
relation to international trade. Emboldened by Supreme Court decisions 
in the 1990s that gave decisive weight to the unwritten structural 
principles of the constitution,64 UL Canada also argued that the 
regulation violated the principle, allegedly inherent in the structure of 
federalism, that goods, regardless of colour, should be able to move 
freely across borders.  
The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed each of these arguments. 
Since the Court found that the legislative purpose of the regulation is to 
protect the Quebec dairy industry, rather than to restrict the sale of an 
imported product, the Court concluded that the regulation’s pith and 
substance relates to local trade, a matter within provincial jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 92(13). Relying on Supreme Court decisions that 
had upheld provincial jurisdiction over marketing and consumer 
protection,65 and distinguishing those that did not,66 the Court of Appeal 
found that the negative effects of the regulation that fall primarily on 
foreign manufacturers are “incidental” to the regulation’s dominant 
purpose.67  
As for the argument that the free movement of goods across borders 
is a binding principle of the federal system, the Quebec Court of Appeal 
rejected this submission as “ill-founded”.67a The Court noted that a 
common market runs counter to federalism’s promotion of provincial 
autonomy and diversity, quoting Bastarache and Iacobucci JJ.’s opinion 
in Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson to that effect: 
                                                                                                            
64 Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] S.C.J. No. 125, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289; Provincial Judges 
Reference, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3; Secession Reference, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, 
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
65 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kellogg’s Co. of Canada, [1978] S.C.J. No. 5, [1978] 2 
S.C.R. 211; Carnation Co. v. Quebec (Agricultural Marketing Board), [1968] S.C.J. No. 11, [1968] 
S.C.R. 238. 
66 Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Assn., [1971] S.C.J. No. 63, 
[1971] S.C.R. 689; Burns Foods v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [1975] S.C.J. No. 151, [1975] 1 
S.C.R. 494. 
67 Supra, note 62, at 421-25. 
67a  Id., at 425. 
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The federal structure of our Constitution authorizes the growth of 
distinct systems of commercial regulation whose application is 
inevitably defined “in terms of provincial boundaries” … This type of 
economic legislation, and the growth of divergent regulatory regimes 
in the provinces, is undoubtedly authorized by the Constitution.68 
2. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. 
A similarly generous approach to provincial jurisdiction is evident in the 
Court’s decision in British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.69 At issue 
was the constitutional validity of the British Columbia Tobacco 
Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act.70 The Act authorizes 
an action by the provincial government against manufacturers of 
tobacco products for the recovery of its health care expenditures 
caused by tobacco-related disease. The Act also alters the common 
law rules applicable in private tort actions to make it easier for 
plaintiffs to recover damages for tobacco-related injuries. A coalition 
of tobacco manufacturers challenged the constitutional validity of the 
statute on a number of grounds. They argued that the Act is outside 
the territorial limits on provincial powers because it targets companies 
mostly situate outside of the province and premised liability on 
exposure to tobacco products even if that exposure occurred outside 
of the province. The tobacco companies also argued that the Act 
should be declared invalid on the grounds that it violates the rule of 
law and judicial independence, two unwritten foundational norms of 
the Constitution to which the Court has attributed binding force. 
Section 92(13) confers on the provinces exclusive jurisdiction to 
make laws in relation to “property and civil rights in the province”. The 
creation of civil causes of action is a matter that falls within section 
92(13). Since the Act deals with civil liability and civil procedure, it is 
clearly in relation to “property and civil rights”. The more difficult issue 
is whether it can also be said that the Act is in relation to rights that are 
situate “in the province”. At trial, Holmes J. thought not. He declared 
the Act ultra vires on the grounds that it exceeded the territorial 
limitations on provincial powers. Justice Holmes found the pith and 
substance of the Act to be the pursuit of the national and international 
                                                                                                            
68 [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157, at 198. 
69 [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473. 
70 S.B.C. 2000, c. 30. 
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tobacco industry to recover B.C.’s health care costs incurred as a result 
of people’s exposure to tobacco products, wherever that exposure 
occurred. Given the national and international nature of the tobacco 
industry, and the substantial exposure B.C. residents have had to 
tobacco products outside of the province, Holmes J. concluded that the 
extraterritorial effects of the Act were “substantial”; they could not be 
treated as minor or incidental.71 
In unanimous decisions, the B.C. Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court of Canada disagreed, concluding that the extraterritorial effects of 
the legislation were incidental to its main purpose. Justice Major, 
writing a succinct and forceful unanimous opinion for the Supreme 
Court, stated that a civil cause of action will be “in the province” if it 
has a “meaningful connection” to the province and does not interfere 
with the legislative sovereignty of other jurisdictions.72 Because the 
cause of action that is the pith and substance of the Act relates to 
recovery of “expenditures incurred by the B.C. government for the 
health care of British Columbians”, Major J. had no difficulty 
concluding that the Act had a meaningful connection to B.C. and did not 
intrude on legislative jurisdiction elsewhere. “[N]o territory”, he wrote, 
“could possibly assert a stronger relationship to that cause of action than 
British Columbia.”73 As for the fact that the Act captures breaches of 
duty and exposure to tobacco products outside of the province, Major J. 
dismissed these extraterritorial effects of the Act as “subsidiary”, 
“irrelevant to the Act’s validity”.74  
Justice Major’s opinion is a textbook example of the generous use 
of the pith and substance doctrine and ancillary effects doctrine to 
enable the creative deployment of provincial legislative jurisdiction in 
response to new social and economic circumstances. In Imperial 
Tobacco, it was not necessary to resort to the living tree metaphor to 
permit growth and expansion of provincial powers, as the Court did for 
federal powers in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference and the 
Employment Insurance Reference. But the effect of Major J.’s 
methodology is the same — constitutional flexibility in the service of 
democracy. 
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72 Supra, note 69, at para. 36. 
73 Id., at para. 38. 
74 Id., at paras. 40-42. 
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The result in Imperial Tobacco was perhaps not surprising given the 
absence of any jurisdictional conflict behind the litigation. Other 
provinces are interested in passing similar legislation, and the Attorney 
General of Canada chose not to intervene. The Court’s ruling evinces a 
healthy skepticism of attempts by private actors to use division of 
powers arguments — and unwritten constitutional principles75 — to 
avoid regulation contrary to their interests. 
3. Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland 
A similar skepticism characterized the Court’s dismissal of the 
challenge to Quebec chicken marketing legislation in Fédération des 
producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland.76 At issue was an 
interlocking federal-provincial marketing scheme for chickens that had 
been enacted following the agricultural products marketing “blueprint”77 
approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1978 Egg Reference78 
(in Canada, the answer to the question “which came first, the chicken or 
the egg case?”, is clear). 
Canadian governments have long sought to ensure a dependable 
supply of agricultural products for consumers and price support for 
producers through the enactment of marketing schemes. Divided 
jurisdiction over the regulation of trade has posed a challenge to the 
design of effective schemes. This challenge can be overcome through 
the enactment of interlocking federal and provincial legislation, coupled 
with the use of administrative delegation and referential incorporation, 
to give one body, in this case the Fédération des producteurs de 
volailles, complete jurisdiction over production and marketing.  
Pelland, a Quebec farmer, produces chickens for sale in Ontario. He 
exceeded his quota imposed by the Fédération by almost 4.5 million 
kilograms. In response to legal action taken against him by the 
Fédération, he argued that the Quebec legislation could not apply to 
production destined solely for extraprovincial trade. The Quebec courts 
                                                                                                            
75 As Major J. wrote, “… in a constitutional democracy such as ours, protection from 
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76 [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292. 
77 Id., at para. 2. 
78 Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 2 
S.C.R. 1198. 
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and the Supreme Court dismissed his argument. Justice Abella, writing 
for a unanimous Court, strongly supported a scheme that, in her words, 
“reflects and reifies Canadian federalism’s constitutional creativity and 
cooperative flexibility”.79 She gave two reasons for upholding the 
application of the Quebec legislation to Mr. Pelland.  
First, liberally using the pith and substance doctrine as the Court did 
in UL Canada and Imperial Tobacco, she concluded that the pith and 
substance of the Quebec legislation was the regulation of agricultural 
production, a matter within provincial jurisdiction. In her view, the 
purpose of the Act was not the control of extraprovincial trade, and its 
effects on extraprovincial trade were incidental.80 Justice Abella 
emphasized that overlapping jurisdiction is inevitable and tolerable in a 
federal state, hence the need to focus on the core character of the 
impugned legislation to determine validity. It followed that the Quebec 
legislation could apply to Mr. Pelland’s production of its own force, 
without any federal assistance.  
Second, in any case, the federal delegation of jurisdiction over 
extraprovincial trade to the Fédération was valid and provided a further 
reason why Mr. Pelland must submit to the production quota imposed 
on him. Justice Abella’s concluding comments are strongly supportive 
of the legal architecture of cooperative federalism put in place in 1978: 
I see no principled basis for disentangling what has proven to be a 
successful federal-provincial merger. Because provincial governments 
lack jurisdiction over extraprovincial trade in agricultural products, 
Parliament authorized the creation of federal marketing boards and the 
delegation to provincial marketing boards of regulatory jurisdiction 
over interprovincial and export trade. Each level of government 
enacted laws and regulations, based on their respective legislative 
competencies, to create a unified and coherent regulatory scheme. The 
quota system is an attempt to maintain an equilibrium between supply 
and demand and attenuate the inherent instability of the markets. To 
achieve this balance, it cannot exempt producers who seek to avoid 
production control limits by devoting all or any of their production to 
extraprovincial trade.81 
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V. EXPANDING APPROACH TO PARAMOUNTCY 
Given the Court’s tendency to uphold challenged statutes by interpreting 
federal and provincial heads of power generously, thus permitting the 
growth of de facto areas of concurrent jurisdiction, it becomes 
increasingly important to the federal balance of powers for the Court to 
affirm a limited definition of conflict that gives rise to federal 
paramountcy. Paramountcy is the federal government’s trump card. A 
broad definition of when it can be put in play stacks the deck of 
cooperative federalism too strongly in the direction of the federal 
government.82 It empowers Parliament to oust provincial legislatures’ 
ability to pursue distinct policies in areas of overlapping jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, during the same time period that the Court has practised 
“considerable circumspection”83 when invited to use declarations of 
ultra vires to police the division of powers, it has adopted a broader 
definition of the kinds of conflict that will give rise to federal 
paramountcy. The result is the potential for the exclusive reign of 
federal legislative policy choices in areas of shared jurisdiction. The 
simultaneous expansion of concurrency and paramountcy poses a 
serious threat to the federal principle in Canada. It puts provincial 
autonomy at the mercy of federal forbearance. 
1. Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan 
The Court’s 2005 ruling on the paramountcy rule, Rothmans, Benson & 
Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan,84 is a significant consolidation and 
restatement of the revised approach the Court has followed since 1990. 
There is no need to discuss the decision at any length here, as Peter 
Hogg has described its significance with his usual clarity in his 
contribution to this volume.85 The essence of the Court’s ruling is that it 
confirms that the narrow “impossibility of dual compliance” test for 
                                                                                                            
82 Given the importance of protecting regional diversity in the Canadian context, the need 
for a narrow approach to the paramountcy rule is one point on which anglophone and francophone 
scholars tend to agree. See, e.g., David Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 46; Eugénie Brouillet, La Négation de la Nation: 
L’identité culturelle québécoise et le fédéralisme canadien (Septentrion: Sillery, Qué., 2005) at 
270-75. 
83 Employment Insurance Reference, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, at para. 8. 
84 [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188. 
85 Peter W. Hogg, “Paramountcy and Tobacco”, in this volume. 
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conflict86 has been supplemented by, or absorbed into, a broader 
“frustration of the federal legislative purpose” test.87 In the words of 
Major J., writing for a unanimous Court in Rothmans,  
… the overarching principle … is that a provincial enactment must not 
frustrate the purpose of a federal enactment, whether by making it 
impossible to comply with the latter or by some other means. In this 
way, impossibility of dual compliance is sufficient but not the only test 
for inconsistency.88 
When adopting the impossibility of dual compliance test in 1982, 
Dickson J. justified his choice by reference to the value of provincial 
autonomy.89 Now, the focus has shifted from protecting provincial 
autonomy to promoting the primacy of federal policy objectives. This is 
a significant normative shift, one that has been introduced by the Court 
with no discussion of the values that have driven its choice or of the 
consequences that might ensue. This is unfortunate, for as Zoe Oxaal 
puts it, 
… no matter where one sits in debates on federalism, when changes to 
the balance of the federal system come about through incremental 
changes in the jurisprudence, then they ought to be closely scrutinized, 
just as we would scrutinize proposed constitutional amendments. 
Federalism is the blueprint of the Canadian constitutional structure, 
and interpretive shifts in its doctrines, such as federal paramountcy, 
have “profound implications ... for the balance of power in the federal 
system.”90 
As Peter Hogg’s paper discusses,91 in Rothmans the Supreme Court 
concluded, reversing the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, that 
Saskatchewan’s legislation prohibiting retail displays of tobacco 
                                                                                                            
86 The leading case espousing this approach is Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 
S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161. 
87 The frustration of the federal legislative purpose was first articulated by La Forest J. in 
Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] S.C.J. No. 9, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 and subsequently applied in 
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88 Supra, note 84, at para. 14. 
89 Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, supra, note 86, at 190. 
90 Zoe Oxaal, “Cigarettes Behind Curtains: Federal Paramountcy and the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal: A Comment on Rothmans, Benson and Hedges v. Saskatchewan” (2004) 67 Sask. 
L. Rev. 401, at 411. 
91 Supra, note 85. 
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products did not frustrate Parliament’s legislative purpose in permitting 
such displays. The provincial right to pursue distinct legislative policies 
reflecting local needs and desires thus prevailed in an area of shared 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court’s approach does not augur well for 
the future of the federal principle.  
If federal policy objectives are treated as supreme, the exercise of 
provincial autonomy in areas of shared jurisdiction is rendered entirely 
dependent upon the will of the federal Parliament. If one of Parliament’s 
policy objectives is to oust provincial legislation entirely from an area of 
shared jurisdiction, then apparently all Parliament has to do is say so. In 
essence the definition of conflict adopted by the Court transfers control 
over the scope of the paramountcy rule from the judiciary to Parliament. 
Consider Major J.’s response to Rothmans’ submission that Parliament 
intended to oust provincial legislation from the regulation of retail 
tobacco displays: 
In my view, to impute to Parliament such an intention to “occup[y] the 
field” in the absence of very clear statutory language to that effect 
would be to stray from the path of judicial restraint in questions of 
paramountcy that this Court has taken …92 
With all due respect, the Court’s focus on the primacy of federal 
legislative purposes is not the path of judicial restraint. Judicial restraint 
was the result in Rothmans, but only because of Parliamentary restraint. 
Parliament now decides whether overlapping provincial legislation can 
operate in areas of shared jurisdiction. 
No doubt the result in Rothmans was influenced by the Attorney 
General’s intervention arguing that Parliament’s objective was not 
frustrated by the Saskatchewan law. As Major J. explained at the end of 
his opinion in Rothmans: 
While the submissions of the federal government are obviously not 
determinative of the legal question of inconsistency, there is precedent 
from this Court for bearing in mind the other level of government’s 
position in resolving federalism issues …93 
Would provincial autonomy have prevailed in Rothmans if the 
Attorney General of Canada had submitted that the Saskatchewan 
provisions did frustrate Parliament’s legislative objective? It is difficult 
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to say. We can say that it is increasingly important for provincial laws to 
be aligned with federal legislative policies if they are to operate in areas 
of overlapping jurisdiction. This is not good news for provincial 
autonomy.  
VI. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT, DEMOCRACY AND FEDERALISM 
Judicial reluctance to issue rulings of ultra vires on federalism grounds, as 
we witnessed on the part of the Supreme Court in 2005 — indeed for the 
past two decades — has the laudable effect of maximizing the democratic 
space available to Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Especially in 
comparison to the anti-democratic tendencies of the “watertight 
compartments” paradigm favoured by the courts at times in the past,94 the 
Court’s commitment to giving both Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures the benefit of the doubt should be applauded. It leaves the 
resolution of federalism disputes primarily to intergovernmental 
negotiations between politically accountable officials. Because of these 
democratic advantages, and in light of the inherently subjective elements 
of judicial review, many leading constitutional scholars — among them 
Paul Weiler,95 Peter Hogg96 and David Beatty97 — have urged the Court to 
exercise restraint when determining whether Parliament or a provincial 
legislature has complied with the division of powers. These apostles of 
restraint ought to be pleased with the Court’s apparent conversion to the 
cause. 
                                                                                                            
94 The classical view of legislative heads of power as “watertight compartments” has anti-
democratic tendencies because social problems deserving legislative responses rarely fit neatly 
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government’s powers are inevitable. For a discussion, see Bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of 
the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and the 
First Nations” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308. 
95 Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974). 
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 David Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1995). Beatty describes the “essence of the federal principle” as the protection of 
“the autonomy and sovereignty of both levels of government as much as possible”. Id., at 41-42. He 
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which both levels of government have some authority to act.” Id., at 46. 
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It would be a mistake to think that the Court’s role in shaping the 
law of federalism is only significant when it declares statutes invalid. 
Whatever results it reaches, the Court’s decisions have an important 
influence on the scope of governments’ powers and their respective 
bargaining positions in intergovernmental negotiations. Moreover, the 
restraint the Court has exercised regarding declarations of invalidity 
over the past two decades has been matched over the same period by an 
expansion of the test for conflict giving rise to federal paramountcy and 
increased resort to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to restrict 
the operation of provincial statutes. The combined effect of these trends 
has been to increase the legal potential for federal dominance and 
provincial subordination.98  
Judicial restraint tends to expand areas of de facto concurrent power 
in which the legislative policy choices of Parliament are paramount. The 
federal principle holds that federal and provincial governments are 
coordinate (equal in status) and autonomous within their respective 
spheres of jurisdiction.99 Judicial interpretation that is faithful to the 
federal principle will thus give equal weight to the claims of federal and 
provincial autonomy.  
Judicial restraint promotes the democratic principle by maximizing 
the powers of democratically elected legislatures but compromises the 
federal principle to the extent that it enlarges areas of concurrent power 
in which the provinces are subordinate to overriding federal 
jurisdiction.100 Because of the federal paramountcy rule, areas of 
concurrent jurisdiction are not ones in which the provinces are equal in 
status to the federal government. It has long been a theme of Québécois 
scholarship on the Constitution that concurrent jurisdiction risks 
producing provincial subordination rather than the equality of status that 
is the hallmark of the federal principle.101 Reflecting this concern, Beetz 
J. argued that provincial and federal jurisdiction should be kept “as far 
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Brouillet, La Négation de la Nation: L’identité culturelle québécoise et le fédéralisme canadien 
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as possible in separate areas”102 to limit the “risk that these two fields of 
exclusive powers will be combined into a single more or less concurrent 
field of powers governed solely by the rule of paramountcy of federal 
legislation. Nothing could be more directly contrary to the principle of 
federalism underlying the Canadian Constitution.”103 As Henri Brun and 
Eugénie Brouillet have argued, in areas of concurrent jurisdiction the 
provinces are in a constitutionally precarious position, “à la merci de la 
volonté fédérale”.104  
In an era of judicial restraint, then, provincial legislative autonomy 
is rendered increasingly dependent upon securing federal consent — or, 
at least, federal forbearance. The provinces have only a conditional 
autonomy within areas of de jure or de facto concurrent jurisdiction. 
Rather than exercising guaranteed, exclusive jurisdiction, they are put in 
the position of supplicants to the federal government. To secure 
legislative space for the pursuit of distinct policy objectives, the 
provinces must negotiate with a national government that is holding the 
legal trump card — the federal paramountcy rule — in its hand. 
Judicial restraint thus casts the primary responsibility for securing 
the equal sovereignty of federal and provincial governments onto the 
political sphere of intergovernmental negotiations. The degree of respect 
accorded to the federal principle will depend on the vagaries of 
intergovernmental politics. Fortunately, from the point of view of the 
federal principle, the potential for federal dominance embedded in the 
law of federalism has been curtailed by the strong centrifugal forces in 
Canadian politics. As K.C. Wheare succinctly put it, the quasi-federal 
elements of Canadian constitutional law are circumscribed by the 
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strongly federal tendencies in Canadian politics.105 In other words, there 
is a significant gap between the law of Canadian federalism and the 
sociopolitical governing realities of the nation, a gap that has grown 
substantially since Wheare published his study.  
The quasi-federal elements of the Canadian constitutional text 
identified by Wheare — such as the federal disallowance and 
declaratory powers — remain legally unaltered. Attempts to amend the 
Constitution to repeal or limit some of its quasi-federal aspects failed 
with the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. The Supreme Court 
has been unwilling to use the federal principle to constrain the legal 
scope of the disallowance or declaratory powers.106 Instead, the Court 
has placed its faith in politics to produce governing practices faithful to 
the federal principle. As La Forest J. wrote regarding the federal 
government’s abandonment of the disallowance power and infrequent 
resort to the declaratory power: 
It was not the courts but political forces that dictated their near demise. 
… Their inappropriate use will always raise grave political issues, 
issues that the provincial authorities and the citizenry would be quick 
to raise. In a word, protection against abuse of these draconian powers 
is left to the inchoate but very real and effective political forces that 
undergird federalism.107 
Just as the Court has placed its faith in the politics of federalism to 
prevent abuse of the disallowance and declaratory powers, it may also 
be confident that expansion of the legal potential for federal dominance 
resulting from judicial interpretation of the division of powers carries 
little risk for the federal principle in practice. Federal governments in 
Canada pay a heavy political price for running roughshod over 
provincial interests, even though they have a growing legal capacity to 
do so. In areas of shared jurisdiction, the federal government is much 
more likely to seek negotiated, mutually satisfactory solutions than it is 
to impose federal priorities on the provinces. Indeed, even in areas of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction, the federal government normally gives 
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significant weight to provincial interests. The politics of a balanced and 
cooperative federalism has prevailed over our quasi-federal constitutional 
law.  
Let me be clear about two points regarding the centralizing 
possibilities created by the law of Canadian federalism. First of all, it is 
nothing new. The potential for federal dominance exists in a number of 
features of the Constitution Act, 1867, most notably in the federal 
powers of disallowance and reservation. My point is simply that the 
Court’s interpretation of the division of powers has done more to 
expand the potential for federal dominance than it has to curtail it. 
Second, the potential for federal dominance created by the constitutional 
text and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the division of powers 
has not been realized in contemporary political practice. Canadian 
provinces are hardly legislatively hamstrung by an overbearing central 
government. To the contrary, the provinces have expansive jurisdiction 
over many important areas of social policy, including education, health 
care and commercial regulation. In contemporary Canadian politics, the 
provinces complain much less about limits on their legislative 
jurisdiction than they do about a mismatch between their fiscal 
resources and the breadth of their legislative responsibilities. In short, 
the centralizing potential inherent in our constitutional law has long 
been held in check by the decentralizing political forces present in the 
federation. 
In light of the powerful centrifugal forces at work in Canadian 
politics, the Supreme Court’s tendency to adopt a posture of judicial 
restraint in federalism cases, and to interpret both federal and provincial 
heads of power expansively, may be defended as the best approach to 
democracy and federalism in the Canadian context. The Court’s 
approach maximizes the democratic space available for the exercise of 
federal and provincial jurisdiction without posing an undue threat to the 
federal principle in practice. It seems likely that if the political restraints 
on Parliamentary interference with provincial autonomy were less 
powerful, the Court might be much more cautious about interpreting 
federal heads of power as broadly and flexibly as it has. 
The risk of the Court’s approach to federalism is precisely the 
degree to which it relies on political bargaining to secure adherence to 
the federal principle. The political dynamics of Canadian federalism 
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may not operate equitably for particular provinces.108 They may vary 
across time or from issue to issue. Even when cooperative federalism is 
working well, the continuing and growing gap between quasi-federal 
law and political practices faithful to the federal principle may itself 
have destabilizing effects for the federation. So long as the provincial 
pursuit of distinct policies in the growing areas of shared jurisdiction is 
conditional upon federal consent or forbearance, the provinces cannot be 
confident that their autonomy will be safeguarded in the future. In these 
circumstances, should we be surprised by the apparent paradox of 
Canada being wracked by periodic existential crises despite the many 
successes of cooperative federalism? Could it be that an important part 
of the explanation for our continuing constitutional struggles is that the 
provinces are so frequently cast in the role of supplicants to federal 
power, negotiating with a legally dominant party for the right to pursue 
distinct legislative policies? 
It is perhaps not possible to be confident about the answers to such 
questions. But if we take the federal principle seriously, if we value the 
promotion and preservation of provincial diversity as much as national 
unity, then there is a strong case for closing the gap between our quasi-
federal constitutional law and our federal political practices, especially 
when it can be done without significantly limiting the totality of 
democratic space available to Parliament and the provincial legislatures. 
Steps in this direction could include returning to a narrow definition of 
conflict for the purposes of the federal paramountcy rule; abandoning or 
significantly reducing resort to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine 
to limit the application of provincial statutes; and exercising great 
caution before allowing federal statutes or conditional federal spending 
to intrude on areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.109 The contrary 
tendencies in the Court’s recent case law are cause for concern. 
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